How tariff rate quotas work, from import permit to landed cost
A tariff rate quota lets a set volume in at a low duty and charges far more on the rest. How quotas are allocated, why they go unfilled and what they cost.

Most people picture a tariff as a single number: a tax of so many per cent on an imported good. A tariff rate quota is two numbers and a volume. Up to a fixed quantity, imports pay a low rate, often zero. Beyond that quantity, they pay a second rate that can be many times higher. The design sounds technical, and it is, but it decides how much foreign cheese, chicken, butter or beef reaches a market, who earns money from importing it and why some quotas sit half empty year after year.
This explainer covers the parts of a tariff rate quota, the ways governments hand out the right to use one, and a worked example of what an importer pays inside and outside the quota.
The three parts of a tariff rate quota
Every tariff rate quota, usually shortened to TRQ, has three settings.
- The quota volume: the quantity that may enter at the lower rate in a given period, often a calendar year or a dairy year.
- The in-quota rate: the tariff on imports within that volume. In many agreements it is zero.
- The over-quota rate: the tariff on everything beyond the volume. Canada calls these the within access and over access commitment rates.
The tool spread widely after the Uruguay Round of trade talks, which created the World Trade Organization in 1995. Countries that had been limiting farm imports with outright quotas were required to turn those limits into tariffs. Many did it by pairing a minimum access volume at low duty with a high tariff on the rest. Canada's dairy, poultry and egg tariffs are a well-known example, but TRQs also apply in Canada to some wheat, barley and beef products, margarine and even cut roses. Other countries use them on Canadian exports: beef and pork going to the European Union, for instance.
How Canada administers them
In Canada, goods subject to TRQs are placed on the Import Control List under the Export and Import Permits Act, and Global Affairs Canada runs most of the quotas. According to the Canada Border Services Agency's guidance on tariff rate quotas, an importer who wants the within access rate for most of these goods needs two things: an import allocation from Global Affairs Canada, and a permit for each shipment issued against that allocation.
A shipment that arrives without a permit is not stopped at the border. It is simply treated as over access, and the higher duty applies. A general import permit lets any eligible importer bring in goods at the over access rates. A few quotas, including those for wheat, barley and their products, work on a first come, first served basis without allocations until the quota is filled.
Ways of handing out the quota
The volume is the headline number in a trade deal, but the allocation method often decides who benefits. The difference between the in-quota price and the domestic price is valuable, and economists call it the quota rent. Whoever holds the allocation captures that rent.
| Method | How it works | Who tends to benefit | Weak point |
|---|---|---|---|
| Historical | Allocations go to firms that imported in a base period, adjusted for use | Established importers | Locks out newcomers; base years age |
| Market share | Shares based on each firm's size in the domestic industry, such as cheese processors | Large domestic processors | Holders may not want to import competing products |
| Equal share | Volume split evenly among eligible applicants | Small and new importers | Pieces can be too small to ship economically |
| Pro rata | Volume divided in proportion to what each applicant requested | Applicants who ask boldly | Encourages inflated requests |
| First come, first served | Duty-free entry until the volume runs out | Importers with fast logistics | Rush at the start of the period |
| Single holder | The whole quota goes to one body | The body chosen, such as a state agency | Little competition in importing |
Canada uses several of these. Its WTO cheese quota is allocated each year to traditional holders on the basis of their historical imports, adjusted for underuse. Quotas under newer agreements have mostly been split by formula among groups such as processors, further processors and distributors. Those formulas have been contested. A dispute panel under the Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement reported in December 2021 that reserving pools of dairy TRQs for processors was inconsistent with Canada's commitments, and New Zealand brought a similar complaint under the CPTPP the following year.
A worked example: landed cost in and out of the quota
All numbers below are illustrative, except the published over-quota rate, which is taken from Canada's tariff schedule for cheddar.
Suppose an importer buys aged cheddar abroad at a customs value of $8.00 a kilogram. Shipping, insurance and handling to a Canadian warehouse add $1.20 a kilogram.
Inside the quota, with a zero in-quota rate:
- Customs value: $8.00
- Duty: $0.00
- Freight and handling: $1.20
- Landed cost: $9.20 a kilogram
Outside the quota, at an over access rate of 245.5 per cent but not less than $3.58 a kilogram:
- Customs value: $8.00
- Duty: 245.5 per cent of $8.00 = $19.64 (well above the $3.58 minimum, so the percentage applies)
- Freight and handling: $1.20
- Landed cost: $28.84 a kilogram
Suppose comparable Canadian cheddar sells at wholesale for $14 a kilogram. Inside the quota, the importer can sell at $14 and keep a margin of about $4.80 a kilogram before its own costs. That margin is the quota rent. Outside the quota, the importer would need to charge more than double the domestic price to break even, so almost nothing moves.
The minimum duty matters for cheap product. If the same cheese were valued at $1.00 a kilogram, 245.5 per cent would come to only $2.46, so the $3.58 floor would apply instead. Specific minimums stop exporters from slipping under the wall by shipping low-value product.
Why quotas go unfilled
A TRQ's fill rate is the share of the volume actually imported in a period. Low fill rates are common, and they are often read as proof that a market is closed by other means. Sometimes they are. The usual reasons are more varied.
- The allocation sits with the wrong firm. A domestic processor holding an allocation to import a product that competes with its own may not use it, or may import only the lines it cannot make itself.
- The pieces are too small. An equal-share split among many applicants can leave allocations below a container load, which makes each shipment expensive.
- The rules on the product exclude most supply. A market can have open quota volume and still demand standards the exporter's farms do not meet. European rules against beef from cattle given growth hormones are a standard example; animal health and feed additive rules can do the same, as the case of ractopamine in the pork trade showed.
- The price gap is narrow. If world prices rise toward the domestic price, the quota rent shrinks and importing becomes less attractive.
- The administration is slow. Short permit windows, return deadlines and penalties for underuse can discourage firms from taking on allocations at all.
Governments try to reduce underuse with return and reallocation rules: holders who do not expect to use an allocation can hand it back by a deadline, and those who repeatedly underuse may receive less in later years. Canada also allows transfers between holders with approval from Global Affairs Canada.
Why TRQs persist
From an economist's point of view, a TRQ is an odd instrument. It keeps a high tariff in place for most trade, gives a rent to whoever holds the licence and creates an administrative system to decide who that is. Removing the over-quota tariff would be simpler.
From a negotiator's point of view, TRQs solve a real problem. They let a country open a measured amount of access while keeping control of the total, and they can be widened a little in each agreement without dismantling a domestic system. That is why they show up whenever supply management is discussed, as the overview of the milk supply management debate explains, and why so much of the bargaining in the CETA, CPTPP and CUSMA talks turned on allocation rules rather than tariff rates. More on how access is negotiated is collected under trade and markets.
When a new TRQ is announced, four questions tell you most of what it will do in practice: what the in-quota rate is, how the volume compares with the domestic market, who gets the allocations, and what happens to the part that goes unused.

Duncan Strathearn
Duncan lives in Kingston, Ontario, and follows agricultural trade talks, tariff schedules and the policy frameworks that sit behind them. He reads trade agreements so readers do not have to.



